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For most economists working in the ﬁeld of health care,
particularly those working on the economic evaluation of
health technologies, the logic of being concerned about the
relative effectiveness of competing interventions and the
opportunity cost of the resources involved is instinctive.
Difﬁcult choices have to be made within the inevitably
limited resources available to publicly funded (and indeed
private insurance-based) health care provision. It is an easy
step then to suggest one should maximise the utility of a
population within the constraints of a predetermined bud-
get or at politically acceptable future cost. For many
economists, though not all, it requires only two small steps
to move from utility maximisation, to health maximisation
and then to operationalise that as QALY maximisation.
And, some key reimbursement and/or coverage authorities
have bought into that argument as a logical, operational
deﬁnition of their mandate.
Economists, of course, readily concern themselves as to
whether the underlying concepts of cost-effectiveness
generally, and of QALY maximisation with a budget
constraint in particular, are consistent with economists own
deﬁnitions of logical behaviour as expressed in welfare
theory (for example, the paper by Bengt Liljas and the
subsequent comments in this Journal) [1–3]. Those who
take an extra-welfarist view of the issues may be less
concerned about the ﬁt with economic theory and more
about the ﬁt with decision-makers explicit or implicit cri-
teria [4].
What is more, there is a widespread assumption that
explicitness and transparency are desirable characteristics
in the process of making the necessary difﬁcult choices
about what can, and should, be afforded (as, for example,
in a proposed framework for classifying decision-making
systems using technology assessment) [5]. But it is not
clear that such explicitness is desired by all. Many politi-
cians, and perhaps the public they represent, often seem to
want to avoid clarity and transparency and prefer difﬁcult
choices to be fudged.
In the UK, where ‘rationing’ has been widely accepted
as a necessary characteristic of the NHS, the National
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was originally sold
to the public as a way of avoiding the use of ineffective
interventions and ensuring that ‘effective new treatments
will be spread promptly and evenly around the country’
[6]. Nevertheless, NICE has led the way in making its
decisions on the availability of speciﬁc technologies as
transparent and explicit as possible and not hiding the fact
when it does not recommend an effective medicine because
it is not also acceptably cost-effective. But this ‘virtue’ of
transparency and explicitness receives a very mixed reac-
tion in the media. Some commentators have noted recently
that ‘public understanding and support for the work of
NICE as evidenced by the UK’s media coverage, with very
few exceptions, has been increasing’. [7] But virtually,
every NICE decision that does not recommend the use of a
new drug, or limits its recommended use to a subset of the
patients within its broader licence, is still strongly criticised
in (politically important) parts of the popular daily press.
Arguably, one of the political drivers for the proposed
move to value-based pricing (VBP) is to avoid the politi-
cally difﬁcult headlines when NICE ‘says no’. Instead, if
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company, then the responsibility for a drug not being
available to the NHS is passed back to the ‘unreasonable’
pharmaceutical company and the political hope may be that
the opprobrium will fall on the company and not on the
NHS [8]. However, this may not in practise be how things
are perceived. Based on experience to date, even where the
same logic applies as when a medicine is viewed by NICE
as not being adequately cost-effective at the price the
company has chosen, the company is rarely (if ever) seen
as the villain of the piece ‘demanding’ too high a price;
rather, the NHS is viewed as failing to ﬁnd the necessary
money for a new drug. So, even in a country where the
reality of ‘rationing’ (or the more generous sounding
‘priority setting’) has been an accepted part of the NHS,
almost from its inception, politicians ﬁnd saying no is
uncomfortable. And, delegating that responsibility to a
body such as NICE only partially removes the discomfort.
In the United States, there is obvious public distaste for
rationing of any form with vehement public outcry when it
appears that limits are placed on access to care. This was
never more apparent than with the furore surrounding the
US Preventative Services Task Force (USPSTF) revised
guidelines for breast cancer screening [9]. Recommenda-
tions that routine breast cancer screening should begin at
age 50, as opposed to the previous age threshold of 40,
were met with claims that this was the start of unacceptable
rationing.
Even in circumstances where there are clear budgetary
constraints, care is taken so as to avoid claims of rationing.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
administer Medicare, the health care insurance for those
aged 65 years and over and certain people with disabilities.
For new medical technologies CMS must decide whether
to provide coverage from its limited budget. In contrast to
the situation in the UK, CMS are particularly vague with
respect to their decision-making criteria. Medical technol-
ogies are covered if they are deemed ‘reasonable and
necessary’ for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury
[10]. Lack of clarity in the decision-making criteria has led
to uncertainty as to the coverage of medical technology and
to what extent CMS can inﬂuence the efﬁcient allocation of
health care resources [11]. Whilst research has shown that
coverage of medical technologies within Medicare, deter-
mined largely on clinical effectiveness, often appears to be
broadly consistent with a criterion of economic efﬁciency,
a number of explicitly covered technologies are estimated
to have a cost-effectiveness ratio greatly in excess of what
could be considered acceptable threshold values [12].
In many countries in between the two extremes of the
UK and the USA, systems struggle to ﬁnd what they
believe is a socially acceptable balance between providing
all that is clinically effective and only that which is
economically efﬁcient. In France, as was discussed in a
recent EJHE editorial, the Haute Autorite ´ de Sante ´ (HAS)
has created a commission ‘to perform technology assess-
ment on all relevant dimensions to inform the decision
maker’ which now formally is required to include, but is no
sense limited to, economic efﬁciency [13].
As a result, politicians in most countries have been
unwilling to engage in an open public debate about how
such decisions should be made. They prefer to talk about
eradicating inefﬁciency or structural changes, rather than
directly addressing the issue of the criteria on which dif-
ﬁcult choices should be made, and there have been few
examples of formal exercises to consult the public about
decision-making. An interesting but isolated example was a
public consultation initiative in Israel, in which a random
sample of the population was provided with background
materials and over a period of 6 months met to discuss
policy questions associated with equity and coverage pri-
orities [14]. But despite the participants’ willingness to
participate in future consultations, the initiative was not
continued. Again, NICE has probably gone further than
most such institutions in setting up a standing body—their
Citizens Council—to try to understand the values that
members of the public, with no professional interest in
health care, believe should underpin NICE’s technology
appraisals and other work. These social value judgements
are captured in a document of principles [15]. The views
that emerge are broadly consistent with a QALY maximi-
sation approach, and they reject an additional ‘rule of
rescue’. They do state, however, that ‘Decisions about
whether to recommend interventions should not be based
on evidence of their relative costs and beneﬁts alone. NICE
must consider other factors when developing its guidance,
including the need to distribute health resources in the
fairest way within society as a whole’. But they do not
provide much help as to how the efﬁciency and fairness
should be balanced. But valuable as that exercise is, can
such a body of 30 people drawn from a large number of
self-selected volunteers, meeting twice a year for 3 days at
a time, really reﬂect the diverse views of the public as a
whole? And to what extent are the Council’s views inevi-
tably refracted through the prism of the organisation of
which it is a part?
As long as politicians for the most part evade the reality
of the need for stark choices, then, it is not surprising that
the public does not spontaneously recognise that need and
suggest how they think the choices should be made.
Unfortunately, there are few situations, if any, where we
can as economists observe the well-informed revealed
preferences of members of the public as they choose
between a range of competing (publicly funded) health care
systems each allocating scarce resources according to dif-
ferent criteria. Were such situations to exist, we might be
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explicit exercises. In practice, we have to rely largely on
stated preference studies of one sort or another and these
are not always easy to interpret and they require replication
and validation. What is more, we might reasonably expect
that such preferences will not be universal, but will be
nationally or locally contextual—a function of the political
and social history of the countries concerned—and strongly
inﬂuenced by the current systems and their perceived
strengths and weaknesses.
Given the importance of the issue, it is curious that there
appear to have been very few major, systematic attempts to
study how the public really would like to see choices made,
although over the years there have been many small aca-
demic studies generally addressing speciﬁc aspects of the
broad issue and focussing on speciﬁc contexts. This edi-
torial is not the place to attempt a systematic review of all
the evidence, although such a review would be valuable.
Sufﬁce it here to selectively illustrate the sorts of issues
that studies have addressed and the results they have found.
A number of studies have shown that the public would not
naturally choose the most efﬁcient allocation of resources
and aim simply to maximise QALYs gained. For example,
a discrete choice experiment study examined public pref-
erences for allocating organs in liver transplantation and
showed that the public would sacriﬁce some level of efﬁ-
ciency to increase equity and to give a chance of receiving
an organ to all groups, including those with the poorest
expected survival [16]. Other studies have attempted to
assess but have struggled to reach ﬁrm conclusions as to
whether the nature of the disease problem or the charac-
teristics of the recipient would lead the public to differ-
entially ‘weight’ a QALY gain [17, 18]. Another recent
study used a discrete choice experiment approach to get
members of the public to choose between technology
scenarios to test, amongst other factors, whether severity of
the health state was an important independent factor for the
public [19]. Methodological issues abound, not least the
issue as to whether surveys, and the immediate responses
they invoke, accurately represent some underlying views
held by the public or whether discussion and deliberation
should be used to allow for reﬂection, to help develop their
ideas and to enable them to provide more considered
responses [20].
Yet, despite this patchy evidence that suggests public
views are complex and nuanced, many decision-makers
have clear statements of the relatively simple criteria they
wish to use and as pragmatic economists we can simply
respond to these. But would it not be useful to those
decision-makers, and all the more to the public on whose
behalf they act, to make a major effort to understand rel-
evant public preferences regarding the allocation of scarce
health resources? Despite the numerous isolated academic
studies, a real debate and engagement with the public does
not appear to be happening yet. A recent survey looking at
the experiences of priority setting in eight countries con-
cluded that despite the fact that all had statements of
principles on which to base priorities, there was no evi-
dence that ‘priority setting exercises have led to the
envisaged ideal of an open and participatory public
involvement in decision-making’ [21].
Will things change? Perhaps, the storm of the ongoing
international ﬁnancial crisis will bring a ray, if not of
sunshine, at least of reality. In Europe, the ﬁnancial crisis
is making hard choices the focus of attention. Politicians
are at last learning to say that desired services, including
many that have been publicly provided in the past, cannot
(or can no longer) be afforded. Pension expectations are
being drawn in; spending on many public services is
being considerably reduced. Perhaps, this will create an
environment where politicians will be bold and honest
enough to engage the public in a serious debate about
how these difﬁcult choices should be made, particularly
in health. It is the public’s money that is being spent and
their health that is affected; perhaps as health service
researchers, we should attempt to help decision-makers
understand more fully what the public think and what
their preferences are. Then, at least, decision-makers
could act with knowledge of public views rather than in
ignorance of them.
We are not the ﬁrst to worry that current economic
evaluation may not be consistent with society’s health
values [22]. Nor probably will we be the last, because a
comprehensive research agenda to address these questions
would be both huge and complex. Existing experience
shows that it is not easy. The questions, both substantive
and methodological, are numerous but should not the
health economic community begin systematically to build
on the examples of the work to date? It is a fascinating and
important area with some very signiﬁcant implications for
the relevance of current economic evaluations.
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